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This paper presents the results of an analysis of data on individual bank loans of non-
financial corporations in the Czech Republic taken from the CNB’s Central Credit 
Register. It focuses on the question of how firms obtain financing from domestic banks. 
The results show that the vast majority of non-financial corporations use the services of 
just one relationship lender. Small and young firms in technology- and knowledge-
intensive industries tend to concentrate their credit needs in a single bank, whereas less 
creditworthy firms and firms in cyclical industries tend to borrow from more than one 
bank. The analysis also reveals different behaviour of firms towards financing banks in 
the case of multiple lenders. Finally, it turns out that the level of credit risk at bank level 
decreases in line with the extent to which firms applying single relationship lending occur 
in the bank’s portfolio. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
This paper provides the first evidence on the phenomenon of relationship lending in the 
Czech Republic. The analysis is based on data on individual bank loans of non-financial 
corporations in the Czech Republic taken from the CNB’s Central Credit Register and 
focuses on the question of how firms obtain financing from domestic banks. These data 
have not previously been used for analytical purposes, so this paper represents the first 
research study drawing on this original source of data. 
Relationship lending is usually defined as a situation where there are close ties between the 
firm and the lender. The usual indicator of this model is the number of lenders, with the 
existence of just one bank corresponding to relationship lending. However, for large firms, 
which often use the services of multiple banks, this indicator is too restrictive; we thus use 
also an alternative indicator of the share of the most significant bank in the company’s total 
debt.  
Relationship lending may be the optimal financial strategy for many companies, as a 
relationship lender has a good knowledge of the firm’s credit history and performance and 
can react optimally to its evolving financing needs. From the bank’s perspective, 
relationship lending may be an attractive business strategy, since it maximises the benefits 
while minimising the necessary borrower monitoring costs. This reduces the main problem 
of banking business, namely the information asymmetry between borrower and lender. 
The results show that the vast majority of non-financial corporations use the services of just 
one relationship lender. Small and young firms in technology- and knowledge-intensive 
industries tend to concentrate their credit needs in a single bank, whereas less creditworthy 
firms and firms in cyclical industries tend to borrow from more than one bank.  
The data also reveal that firms applying relationship lending have a higher share of 
overdrafts and debit balances in their total bank debt than companies that do not apply this 
model. This may be linked with company size, since relationship lending is applied more by 
small firms. They usually have more volatile revenues, as they have a smaller number of 
clients, and so they are forced to use overdraft or debit facilities more often for their day-to-
day operations. 
The analysis of firms using multiple banks showed that firms usually have two large banks 
as the first two most important lenders, while medium-sized banks and foreign banks 
branches occupy more distant places in the order of financing importance. As the lending 
services offered to firms by all the large banks are broadly similar, this might indicate that 
firms opt for the “large–large” combination as a strategy for avoiding the “hold-up” 
problem (i.e. the problem of being “captured” by one relationship lender). The firm’s                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   3       
 
bargaining position as regards lending conditions improves over time, as its credit history is 
known to more than one bank.  
For firms using multiple banks, it was shown that firms behave differently towards different 
banks in terms of the extent to which they use overdrafts or FX loans. Interestingly, as 
regards the firms’ behaviour towards different banks in the event of repayment difficulties, 
the data indicates that a half of firms with two relationship lenders tend to default with their 
main bank and keep up their repayments with the second bank.  
The paper also analyses whether the financing model chosen has a significant effect on the 
credit risk of relationship lenders. It turns out that the level of credit risk at bank level 
decreases in line with the extent to which firms applying single relationship lending occur 
in the bank’s portfolio. This result can be explained by a better knowledge of such clients 
by the bank and more effective risk management in this segment and is largely in line with 
the theoretical literature. 4   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis that started in summer 2007 has raised concerns about how banks 
trying to maintain sensible solvency and liquidity values will respond in their traditional 
portfolios, i.e. primarily in the segment of lending to non-financial clients. The signals so 
far suggest that banks have responded vis-à-vis their customers by tightening all three 
dimensions of their financial conditions, i.e. the volume of loans (or new loans), the interest 
conditions (higher interest rates) and the non-interest conditions (the collateral required and 
the proportion of project self-financing). From firms’ perspective, the situation may thus be 
highly unfavourable, as the critical situation in the financial markets coupled with high risk 
aversion reduces the opportunities for market financing using market instruments (bonds, 
equities and other securities). At times of financial turbulence, bank financing thus becomes 
the primary source of external finance again, giving banks a relatively strong position in 
determining the financial conditions.  
The financial conditions can also be affected by whether a firm borrows from just one 
relationship lender or whether it obtains financing from multiple banks. Relationship 
lending
1 is most often cited as a phenomenon of the German banking system, but the 
available anecdotal evidence suggests that this model might be also present in other 
economies, including the Czech Republic. An important question is whether this bank 
financing model is beneficial to the firm at a time of economic crisis.  
This paper sets out to determine which bank financing model predominates in the Czech 
Republic, what its main characteristics are, and what factors the choice of bank financing 
model depends on at firm level. We also analyse whether the model chosen has a significant 
effect on the credit risk of relationship lenders.  
This paper uses internal data from the database of the CNB’s Central Credit Register 
(CRC), which since 2002 has been recording all new credit relationships between 
companies and banks in the Czech Republic. These data have not previously been used for 
analytical purposes, so this paper represents the first research study drawing on this original 
source of data.
2  
Section 2 provides a short review of literature, while section 3 presents the CRC data used. 
Section 4 contains numerous descriptive statistics regarding the model of bank financing of 
                                                           
1 Some papers use the term “relationship banking” (e.g. Giovanni et al. 2001); we decided to use the term 
“relationship lending” as we focus only on the lending side of a possibly much richer relationship 
between firms and banks that could also include deposit accounts and investment banking services. 
2 A first version of this analysis was published as a special feature in the Czech National Bank’s Financial 
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firms in the Czech Republic. Section 5 analyses the determinants of the choice of the 
number of lending relationships at firm level, and section 6 tests the effect of the application 
of relationship lending on the credit risk of banks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Relationship lending may be the optimal financial strategy for many companies, as a 
relationship lender has a good knowledge of the firm’s credit history and performance and 
can react optimally to its evolving financing needs. From the bank’s perspective, 
relationship lending may be an attractive business strategy, since it maximises the benefits 
while minimising the necessary borrower monitoring costs. This reduces the main problem 
of banking business, namely the information asymmetry between borrower and lender. 
“Service packages” for businesses and “customised financing” are indeed a manifestation of 
a business model that focuses on a single bank winning a client and financing all its needs. 
A theoretical approach to different types of bank financing can be found in Janda (2007). 
According to the conclusions of previous studies, company characteristics and competition 
are important determinants of the bank-customer relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Nam, 2004; Elsas, 2005). These studies also reveal that companies with a relationship 
lender have easier access to loan financing (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 
1998), although an effect on interest conditions has not been unambiguously proved (Stein 
et al., 2007; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Gorton and Schmid, 
1996).  
It is relevant to ask whether relationship lending is beneficial to the firm during a recession. 
This would be true if the above arguments concerning easier access to financing apply even 
at times of financial distress. Giovanni et al. (2001) tested the impact of relationship lending 
on small and medium-sized firms in Korea during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. They 
pointed out that relationship lending with surviving banks has a positive effect on firms 
during a financial crisis. They argue that for many viable small and medium-sized firms in 
Korea, relationship lending reduced liquidity constraints and thus diminished the probability 
of firms’ bankruptcy. However, one counter-argument is that the consequences of 
cancelling a line of credit to a company may be greater in the case of relationship lending, 
because the company has no credit history with any other bank and so its chances of raising 
alternative bank financing under reasonable interest conditions are reduced. Nevertheless, 
this argument has not been empirically confirmed in the literature. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) define relationship lending as a situation where there are close 
ties between the firm and the lender. The usual indicator of this model is the number of 
lenders, with the existence of just one bank corresponding to relationship lending. However, 6   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
for large firms, which often use the services of multiple banks, this indicator is too 
restrictive. Even if it uses multiple banks, the firm may have a truly close, tight and long-
term relationship with just one lender. The existing literature offers three main indicators of 
close ties: (a) the number of lending relationships, (b) the share of the most significant bank 
in the company’s total debt, and (c) the duration of the main lending relationship (Ongena 
and Smith, 2001; Memmel et al., 2007). The share of the most important bank turns out to 
be the indicator with the highest information value for close ties between a company and a 
bank (Elsas, 2005). 
There are not many research studies focusing on the relationship between the model of bank 
financing and credit risk. Theoretical approaches to this research question support the 
argument that banks that apply a business model focusing on relationship lending tend to 
experience lower credit risk in their portfolios (von Thadden, 2004).
3 An area of research 
that relates bank financing and credit risk is the soft budget constraint literature, which 
argues that especially in emerging market economies where alternative external corporate 
financing is not available, weak (state-owned) banks have incentives to fund projects with 
negative net present value, leading to accumulation of credit risk (Dewatripont and Maskin, 
1995).
4 Empirical studies that relate the bank financing model and bad loan accumulation 
include Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999). 
Some literature emphasises the positive aspects of single relationship lending. This 
relationship allows creditors to take a longer view of investments and reduce financial 
constraints for firms in temporary difficulties (Rajan, 1992; Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein, 1991). For this reason, the single bank relationship is proposed as an optimal 
model for transition economies, where external non-banking sources of financing are 
limited (Aoki and Patrick, 1994).  
3. Data 
The CNB’s Central Credit Register contains data on all balance sheet (and some off-balance 
sheet) exposures of domestic banks (including branches of foreign banks) to resident and 
non-resident legal entities and to sole traders. Each record (line in the database) is a loan-
specific record containing bank, firm, month and year, and a number of firm-, bank- and 
loan-specific information. The data are at monthly frequency. The register was established 
at the end of 2002 and contains not only all new loans provided since that date, but also all 
bank loans already existing at the end of 2002. For example, the oldest loan registered in the 
Credit Register (in December 2002) had been provided to a Czech company in 1990. The 
                                                           
3 The logic is explained in Section 6. 
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database is thus not truncated, with the exception of loans provided and repaid before 2002. 
The reporting of loan data is not subject to any reporting limit.
5 
Anonymised data on bank loans (balance-sheet exposure) to non-financial corporations 
were used for the analysis. Loans to non-residents, sole traders, the public sector and 
financial institutions were not taken into account. In all, the sample contained almost 8 
million records describing the individual loans of around 120,000 companies in the period 
from December 2002 to December 2008 at monthly frequency.  
For each firm, there is information on size (total turnover and number of employees), 
industry, legal form and ownership (public, private-domestic, private-foreign). Banks do not 
report data on companies’ balance sheet or performance to the register, thus basic data on 
companies are uploaded to the register from the RES register of firms operated by the 
Czech Statistical Office. This has three main shortcomings: first, the data on companies 
from the RES are uploaded every month and the characteristics of firms are always 
overwritten with the newest record.
6 Second, the data on size (total turnover and number of 
employees) are given only in categories (16 categories of turnover and 20 categories of 
number of employees). For the analysis, we replaced the number of the category with the 
mean value of each category. Finally, the data on size (either employment or turnover) are 
available only for about half of the firms (60,000 companies).  
Using the information on each firm’s loans, we constructed variables describing the number 
of lending relationships, debits/overdrafts as a percentage of total debt, FX loans as a 
percentage of total bank loans, the year of the oldest granted loan, the firm’s “age” 
(computed as the difference between the year of the observation and the year of the oldest 
granted loan) and client creditworthiness (using information on the default rate in previous 
years). For each firm, we also created variables related to their three most important lenders 
(in terms of the banks’ share in the firm’s total borrowings from domestic banks), namely 
the amount of the share, selected data on the bank and selected data on the credit 
relationship with that bank, i.e. the above-mentioned characteristics of the relationship (debt 
and foreign currency ratios, year of oldest loan and information on default).  
Finally, we created variables at individual bank level, i.e. the 12M default rate in the 
corporate loan portfolio
7, the bank’s market share in total loans to non-financial 
corporations, and the shares of various types of debtors and selected sectors and loans in the 
                                                           
5 The only exception is current account overdrafts up to an amount of 70 euros, which are not reported. 
6 Thus, these firms’ characteristics are time-invariant. For example, if a firm changed ownership from 
private-domestic to private-foreign, the credit register would overwrite the older record (domestic 
ownership) with the newer one (foreign ownership) in all months over the whole life of the loan.  
7 The 12M default rate was computed as the proportion of the bank’s claims that will fall into the category 
“in default for more than 90 days” within 12 months. 8   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
total corporate loan portfolio (foreign currencies, foreign-controlled corporations, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, etc.). Due to the anonymised dataset, we did not have the 
identities of individual banks. The only thing we have for the banks is the bank group (large 
banks, medium-sized banks, small banks and foreign bank branches). 
To be able to run regressions, we further adjusted the dataset in two areas: first, the size of 
the dataset had to be reduced. Thus, the original monthly frequency was changed to 
quarterly frequency. Given that the data are stock data, this change did not lead to any need 
for recalculations. Second, the dataset was split into a “firms dataset” and a “banks dataset” 
so that we could run panel data models, similarly to Memmel (2007, p. 10). 
 
4. Model of Bank Financing of Firms in the Czech Republic  
For the purposes of this paper we use two indicators of relationship lending, namely the 
number of lending relationships and the share of the most significant bank. For the latter, 
we additionally construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the share of the 
main bank is more than 80%. In the text that follows, “single relationship lending” refers to 
the situation where a firm borrows from a single bank. The situation where one bank has a 
dominant share in a company’s borrowings (more than 80%) we term “dominant 
relationship lending”.
8 
The analysed data on the number of lending relationships reveal that relationship lending 
predominates in the Czech Republic. At the end of 2008, 85% of all non-financial 
corporations had just one lender, 12% had two and only around 3% had three or more (see 
Chart 1). Over the past six years, however, single relationship banking has been declining in 
significance, as almost 90% of companies were applying this model in 2002. 
                                                           
8 Another suitable indicator for measuring relationship lending could be the Herfindahl index of 
concentration of creditors. However, in this study we do not use this measure of lender concentration, 
leaving it instead for follow-up research.                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   9       
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Companies by Number of Lending Relationships 



















One lending relationship (left-hand scale)
Two lending relationships (right-hand scale)
Three or more lending relationships (right-hand scale)
 
Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations 
 
It is interesting to compare this figure with Germany, which is considered by theoreticians 
and practicians alike to be the classic example of single relationship lending (the Hausbank 
model). In a study based on the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register, Memmel et al. (2007) 
state that only around 45% of companies in 2002 applied single relationship lending (see 
Table 1).
9 A comparison of the distribution of the number of lending relationships between 
the Czech Republic and Germany reveals that German firms use the services of multiple 
banks to a far greater extent.
10 This difference may be partly due to the different relative 
size of corporations and banks. Germany has far more large enterprises and small regional 






                                                           
9 Memmel et al. (2007) analysed bank loans from the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register for the period 
1993–2004, but the frequency was only yearly. 
10 Memmel et al. (2007) report a maximum value of 197 for the variable “number of lending 
relationships”. In the Czech Republic the maximum number is 11.  
11 This reason is supported by the fact that the data used for the analysis of Germany in Memmel et al. 
(2007) come from the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register, which only contains loans that exceed EUR 
1.5m, i.e. loans primarily to large corporations. 10   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Distribution of Number of Lending Relationships between Czech 
Republic and Germany 
CZ (2008) CZ (2002) Germany (2002)
1 85.0 88.0 43.5
2 12.2 9.8 23.2
3 2.2 1.7 11.4
4 0.4 0.4 5.8
5 0.1 0.1 3.8
6 0.0 0.0 3.3
7 0.0 0.0 2.1
8 0.0 0.0 1.4
9 0.0 0.0 1.1
10+ 0.0 0.0 4.3
No. of lending relationships
in % of all companies
 
  Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations; Memmel et al. (2007) 
 
In the other indicator of relationship lending, i.e. the share of the most important bank in a 
company’s total bank debt, the proportion of companies applying dominant relationship 
lending is of course even higher (see Chart 2). But this indicator is declining over time as 
well. In Germany, the figure is somewhere between 50% and 60% (Schmieder et al., 2008). 
For the Czech Republic, the mean share of the most important bank (for the whole sample 
of all companies regardless of number of financing banks) is almost 97%, which is, of 
course, due to the high proportion of firms with a single relationship lender, with a range of 
14% to 100%. Stein et al. (2007) report an average for this indicator of around 60% (with a 
minimum of 9% and a maximum of 100%). 
                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   11       
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Companies Applying Dominant Relationship Lending 
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Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations 
Given that single relationship lending prevails among Czech firms, it is not surprising that 
large banks
12 dominate as single relationship lenders (see Chart 3). Roughly 70% of 
companies with single relationship lenders choose a large bank as their only bank, while 
around 20% choose a medium-sized bank. The role of branches of foreign banks and small 
banks is limited in this regard.
13 This is somewhat surprising, as the evidence from 
Germany shows that usually small and medium-sized banks act as relationship lenders. The 
reasons might include factors related to competition among the smaller banks, a preference 







                                                           
12 The group “large banks” consists of the four largest banks in the Czech Republic according to total 
assets. Their joint market share in the relevant loan market segment (loans to non-financial corporations) 
was around 66% and surprisingly stable over all 7 years of data availability. 
13 The role of medium-sized banks was not significantly reduced by the change of form of Citibank from 
a medium-sized bank to a branch of a foreign bank in 2008. 
14 Some of the factors could be tested by including more variables for banks, such as assets or equity; 
unfortunately this has to be left for follow-up research, as the dataset was anonymised and these data were 
not available in the credit register. 12   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
Figure 3: Single Relationship Lenders by Bank Category 




















Large banks (lha) Medium-sized banks (rha)
Small banks (rha) Foreign bank branches (rha)
 
Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations 
Note: The chart does not contain building societies, whose role as single relationship lenders 
is minimal. 
 
The data offer more interesting information on which first and second most important banks 
are chosen by firms using multiple banks. The role of foreign bank branches, for instance, 
could be greater here, since these banks offer companies certain specialised services. The 
average share of the first most important bank (for firms that have more than one 
relationship lender) in the total debt of the firm is 77% and the share of the second 
relationship lender is 20%. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms with two relationship 
lenders by the group of the first and second relationship lender. It turns out that large banks 
also have the largest share in the role of second bank, including for firms that already have a 
large bank as their first lender.  
As the lending services offered to firms by all the large banks are broadly similar, firms 
may opt for the “large–large” combination as a strategy for avoiding the problem of being 
“captured” by one relationship lender (Schmieder et al., 2008). Memmel et al. (2008) show 
on German data that firms applying single or dominant relationship lending reduce their 
share with the largest bank in favour of another bank over time as they grow. The firm’s 
bargaining position as regards lending conditions thus improves over time, as its credit 
history is known to more than one bank. This has been theoretically described as a “hold-
up” problem for example in Bannier (2009).                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   13       
 
Table 2 also shows that the second most common combination of relationship lenders is 
large–medium-sized or medium-sized–large (with a very similar number of firms), followed 
by foreign bank branch–large (or large–branch). In these cases, a greater role is probably 
played by the firm’s specific requirements, geographical location (accessibility of the bank), 
efforts made by banks to target specific clients and, for foreign-controlled corporations, 
existing ties between the firm’s owners and the bank. 
Table 2: Distribution of Relationship Lenders by Bank Group for Firms with Two 
Relationship Lenders 









Large banks 35.2 19.1 2.3 5.4
Medium-sized banks 19.1 3.3 0.7 1.7
Small banks 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.3




























Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations 
 
For the sake of completeness, we should mention that for firms using the services of three 
or more banks, large banks again play the most important role, followed by medium-sized 
banks and foreign bank branches. The most common bank combination for these firms is 
thus large–large–large. The factors here may include the firm’s size (the need for syndicated 
financing in large firms) and the strategy of avoiding capture and cutting financing costs, 
although historical ties may also play a role. The largest banks were all to some extent 
specialised in the past decade, so companies used the services of large banks for different 
purposes (payments, investment vs. operating vs. export financing, etc.). Owing to the 
conservative nature of large domestic firms, these ties apparently still survive, even though 
these banks now operate essentially as universal banks offering practically every banking 
service. 
The CRC contains information on whether a company borrows in the form of an overdraft 
or debit balance. This is an indirect indicator that the firm also has a current account with a 
particular bank and that it therefore uses the bank for routine payments with other trading 
partners. The data reveal that firms applying dominant relationship lending have a higher 14   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
share of overdrafts and debit balances in their total bank debt than companies that do not 
apply this model (50% versus 36% of total bank debt). This may be linked with company 
size, since dominant relationship lending is applied more by small firms (see below). They 
usually have more volatile revenues, as they have a smaller number of clients, and so they 
are forced to use overdraft or debit facilities more often for their day-to-day operations.  
For firms using multiple banks, detailed data on their lending relationships allow us to 
analyse whether firms behave differently towards different banks. In the case of overdrafts 
and debit balances, it turns out that firms obtain overdrafts from their main bank to a lesser 
extent than from other banks in the sequence (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Differences in Behaviour towards Various Relationship Lenders 
(average indicators in %) 
Share of overdrafts and debit balances in bank debt
Total 1st bank 2nd bank Total 1st bank 2nd bank 3rd bank
2002 44,6 27,9 27,9 41,2 13,1 11,8 20,3 28,4
2005 57,9 42,7 41,6 56,0 30,2 27,8 35,3 44,5
2008 46,5 37,3 35,7 53,4 32,3 30,8 38,0 49,0
Share of foreign currency loans in bank debt
Total 1st bank 2nd bank Total 1st bank 2nd bank 3rd bank
2002 8,8 8,0 7,8 8,8 11,4 11,9 11,0 15,4
2005 5,4 3,3 3,2 4,6 6,0 6,1 5,9 6,3







Two relationship lenders Three or more relationship lenders
Two relationship lenders Three or more relationship lenders
 
Source: CNB (CRC), authors´ calculations 
 
One of the reasons may be that second and subsequent relationship lenders finance 
companies’ other needs (in particular operations), in which overdrafts naturally have a 
greater weight. Moreover, firms may behave more cautiously towards their main bank in the 
overdraft area and probably do not make full use of overdraft or debit facilities. This 
behaviour has not changed significantly over time, even though the rate of overdraft use has 
changed. 
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Similar behaviour can be observed for the share of FX loans. The average share of FX loans 
in firms’ total bank debt has steadily decreased from around 9% in 2002 to 3.5% in 2008.
15 
This share differs little between firms applying dominant relationship lending and other 
firms, but firms with three or more banks have a higher share of FX loans than firms with 
two relationship lenders (see Table 3). These tend to be larger firms with a strong export 
orientation. It also turns out that in the case of multiple bank financing the share of FX 
loans is usually higher for more distant banks. This is to some extent consistent with the 
finding that foreign bank branches, which specialise in providing FX loans or financing 
international trading, tend to occupy second or third place in the order of financing 
importance.  
The final issue in the area of firms’ different behaviour towards different banks is their 
strategy in the event of repayment difficulties. An analysis of the data reveals that firms 
with two relationship lenders tend to default with their main bank (on average almost 50% 
of firms with repayment difficulties) and keep up their repayments with the second bank. A 
further 30% of firms stop repaying both banks simultaneously.
16 At first glance, this 
situation contrasts with the conclusions of the analysis of behaviour in the area of debit 
balances and overdrafts, where firms try to maintain a good credit history with their main 
bank. A more detailed analysis reveals, however, that firms defaulting primarily with their 
main bank likewise use overdraft and debit facilities with them to a greater extent. In the 
case of three or more relationship lenders, the situation is heterogeneous and no dominant 
model of behaviour can be identified. In percentage terms, the most frequently observed 
phenomenon is default with all three relationship lenders (around 22% of cases), followed 




                                                           
15 This is the unweighted average. The decline is due to a decrease in this share in individual firms and 
partly also to the appreciation of the Czech koruna against other currencies, as well to a change in the set 
of firms towards a higher proportion of (for example smaller) firms using mostly koruna loans. The 
relatively small average amount of this share (as compared to the often cited share of FX loans in total 
loans provided by domestic banks of around 30%) is due to the high proportion of smaller firms with 
mostly koruna loans.  
16 At the end of 2008, this situation switched towards equal default vis-à-vis both relationship lenders 
(50% of all firms in default in 2008 Q4). 
17 Unfortunately, the credit register does not include variables on bank size, ownership, performance and 
balance sheet structure, so a number of potentially important research questions related to different 
behaviour to different lenders is not analysed. 16   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
5. Analysis of the Determinants of the Choice of Single Relationship 
Lending 
Empirical studies analysing the determinants of the choice of bank financing model by 
individual firms (Memmel et al., 2007) find a particularly important role for the size, age 
and creditworthiness of the firm, the technology and knowledge intensity and cyclicality of 
the industry, and the type and size of the lender/lenders. The industry- and firm-level 
characteristics indicate a positive correlation between a firm’s size and age and its number 
of lending relationships, and a negative correlation between the creditworthiness of the firm 
and the technology and knowledge intensity of the industry and the number of lending 
relationships. Stein et al. (2007) set out detailed arguments from the theoretical literature 
supporting these correlations, arguments that are based to a large extent on the problem of 
information asymmetry and strategic behaviour of firms. The geographical location of the 
firm may also play a role, as firms from smaller communities away from financial 
(regional) centres may tend to borrow from the single bank that is most accessible to them. 
For foreign firms, ties between parent companies and foreign banks may also play a role. It 
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Austrian firms, for instance, will borrow mainly 
from banks owned by Austrian banking groups.
18 
We analyse the determinants of the choice of bank financing model using classical 
regression (the pooled OLS method), fixed-effects panel regression and random-effects 
panel regression in order to capture the effects of variables that do not vary over time.
19 The 
share of the main relationship lender in the firm’s total bank debt (i.e. actually the loan 
concentration) was used as the dependent variable.
20 The explanatory variables used were 
firm characteristics (turnover, age of firm, risk of firm), selected industry-level variables, 
namely the cyclicality of the industry (the correlation between the industry’s gross added 
value and overall GDP) and a dummy variable for high and medium-high technology and 
                                                           
18 Variables capturing corporations’ geographical ties and countries of origin were not available, so the 
influence of these factors was not tested in the analysis.  
19 The firm size information does not vary over time as it is taken from the turnover categories in the RES 
(Register of Economic Agents) database and is always overwritten in the CRC historical data by the latest 
information.  
20 Alternatively, we also used the number of banks the firm borrows from. Given the nature of this 
variable, which takes discrete values between 1 and 11, in this case we used Poisson regression, which 
takes the categorical nature of the dependent variable into account. The results, however, are in line with 
the aforementioned findings.                                    Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   17       
 
knowledge intensity industries.
21 As the effect of firm size on bank loan concentration may 
be non-linear, a dummy variable was used for medium-sized and large firms.
22 
The regression results confirm that larger and older enterprises have less concentrated loans 
and hence a greater number of relationship lenders (Table 4).
23 Some non-linearity of the 
effect of firm size on the share of the largest relationship lender was also confirmed, 
although its size is relatively small (about 2 percentage points). Firms in technology- and 
knowledge-intensive industries tend to concentrate their borrowing needs in one bank, 
whereas firms with lower creditworthiness as measured by the default rate in the past two 
years borrow from more than one bank (although this fixed-effects model does not find a 
significant effect). The results are consistent with findings for the German economy 
(Memmel et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2007).  
Table 4: Regression Results for Bank Financing Model 
(OLS, fixed-effects model (FE) and random-effects model (RE)) 
 







0.0289*** -0.0388*** -0.0338*** -0.0124***
[0.00061] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.00087]
-0.00840*** -0.00758*** 0.000294 -0.00330***
[0.00069] [0.00069] [0.00087] [0.00078]
-0.0192*** -0.0140*** -0.0217***
[0.00041] [0.00043] [0.00096]
0.969*** 0.941*** 0.982*** 1.003***
[0.00057] [0.00067] [0.00081] [0.00092]
Industry dummies no yes no no
No. of observations 717346 717346 717346 717346
No. of firms 63088 63088 63088 63088
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01
Risk of firm (past default rate)








Note: standard error in parantheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
                                                           
21 See CZSO, Klasifikace zpracovatelského průmyslu podle technologické náročnosti [Classification of 
manufacturing by technology intensity] and Klasifikace odvětví služeb podle znalostní náročnosti 
[Classification of services by knowledge intensity]. 
22 Variables other than the given ones proved to be insignificant. Descriptive statistics of the relevant 
variables used in the regressions can be found in Appendix.  
23 Information on turnover is not available for all firms, so the regressions using this variable were 
performed only on a subsample containing roughly half the number of firms. 18   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
As regards the industry cyclicality effect, Stein et al. (2007) do not find a significant effect 
of this variable for German firms. The OLS results without industry dummies and the two 
panel estimates on the other hand differ in our case and are significant in both cases. 
Economic intuition would suggest that firms in procyclical industries should use multiple 
relationship lenders and have less concentrated loans, as indicated by the panel estimate 
results, because banks do not like to be the single relationship lenders of too procyclical and 
hence relatively risky firms. It might be that some of the firms (or industries) are 
responsible for this result, so we run OLS with industry dummies. In this case, the results 
are compatible with the panel regression results (Table 4). 
 
6. Effect of Application of Single Relationship Lending on Banking 
Portfolio Risk  
Does a bank’s orientation towards clients applying dominant relationship lending have an 
effect on its portfolio risk, and is that effect positive or negative? The above analysis of the 
determinants of the choice of relationship lending model showed that firms with higher 
creditworthiness (lower default risk) tend to concentrate their loans in a single dominant 
relationship lender.
24 According to von Thadden (2004) this is consequence of a dynamic 
process where creditworthy clients stay with their main relationship lender while 
uncreditworthy clients switch to the model of multiple relationship lenders. Over time, the 
higher proportion of firms applying dominant relationship lending with such lenders should 
thus give rise to a lower corporate portfolio default rate. However, large firms, which are 
generally less risky but due to their size are often financed by syndicated loans from several 
banks, may have the opposite effect. 
To answer this question, we performed a panel regression in which the dependent variable 
was the default rate in banks’ corporate loan portfolio. The explanatory variables used were 
portfolio characteristics, macroeconomic indicators and in particular an indicator for the 
bank’s orientation towards “single” clients as measured by the ratio of loans to clients 
applying dominant relationship lending to the bank’s total loan portfolio (Table 5).
25 
The panel regression results reveal that an orientation towards clients applying dominant 
relationship lending has a positive effect on the bank’s loan portfolio quality. This result can 
be explained by a better knowledge of such clients by the bank and more effective risk 
management in this segment and is largely in line with the theoretical literature (Rajan, 
1992; von Thadden, 2004).  
                                                           
24 Although the fixed-effects panel regression results did not support this conclusion, the alternative 
estimates of the effect of this variable on the number of relationship lenders confirm it. 
25 Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regressions can be found in the Appendix.                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   19       
 
Behr et al. (2007) discuss the benefits of specialisation versus diversification of banks. 
However, concentrating on relationship borrowers cannot be interpreted as a pure 
specialisation strategy, as relationship borrowers can come from different industries and 
have different characteristics. Thus, by focusing on relationship borrowers, banks can reap 
the benefits of diversification as well. 
The panel regressions containing all the banks did not prove any dependence of their credit 
risk on the economic cycle as measured by GDP growth.
26 This is largely due to the 
inclusion of numerous small and medium-sized banks, whose share in the credit risk of the 
banking sector’s total loans is relatively negligible. However, these banks, given their 
relatively small loan portfolios, different strategies and specialisations in selected segments 
of the economy, can show relatively sizeable changes in portfolio structure and performance 
that are not primarily correlated with the economic cycle.
27 If we perform this regression for 
large banks only, dependence on the economic cycle is confirmed. 
Table 5: Panel Regression Results for Credit Risk 
(fixed-effects model; all banks excluding banks with zero default rate) 
 













No. of observations 412 100




Share of clients applying dominant 
relationship banking 
Share of small corporations in total 
portfolio
Share of foreign-controlled corporations 
in portfolio
Share of forex loans in portfolio
 
Note: standard error in parantheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
                                                           
26 The other macroeconomic variables were either insignificant or had a sign inconsistent with economic 
intuition. 
27 Some small and medium-sized banks, for example, applied an aggressive strategy to win market share, 
leading to growth in the credit risk of their portfolios at times when the economy was growing strongly. 20   Adam Geršl and Petr Jakubík 
 
An orientation towards small firms fosters a higher default rate, although this factor is 
reflected in higher client interest rates. Moreover, single or dominant relationship lending, 
where the main bank knows the company well and is better able to manage the risks, 
predominates in small companies. A lower default rate is fostered by greater orientation of 
banks towards foreign-controlled corporations and a lower proportion of FX loans. The last 
two factors, however, are insignificant in large banks. 
7. Conclusions  
This paper provided the first evidence on relationship lending in the Czech Republic using 
data on individual bank loans of non-financial corporations in the Czech Republic taken 
from the CNB’s Central Credit Register. These data have not previously been used for 
analytical purposes, so this paper represents the first research study drawing on this original 
source of data. 
The results of the analysis of the model of bank financing of firms in the Czech Republic 
revealed a high relevance of single (sole) relationship lending. This model is applied 
primarily by small and young firms in technology- and knowledge-intensive industries. By 
contrast, less creditworthy firms and firms in cyclical industries tend to borrow from more 
than one bank.  
The data also revealed that firms applying relationship lending have a higher share of 
overdrafts and debit balances in their total bank debt than companies that do not apply this 
model. This may be linked with company size, since relationship lending is applied more by 
small firms, which usually have more volatile revenues are forced to use overdraft or debit 
facilities more often. 
The analysis showed that for firms with more than one lending relationship, the most 
common combination is to have two large banks as main lenders. Medium-sized banks and 
foreign banks branches occupy more distant places in the order of financing importance. As 
the lending services offered to firms by all the large banks are broadly similar, this might 
indicate that firms opt for the “large–large” combination as a strategy for avoiding the 
“hold-up” problem of being “captured” by one relationship lender. The firm’s bargaining 
position as regards lending conditions improves if its credit history is known to more than 
one bank.  
For firms using multiple banks, it was shown that firms behave differently towards different 
banks in terms of the extent to which they use overdrafts or FX loans. Interestingly, as 
regards the firms’ behaviour towards different banks in the event of repayment difficulties,                                   Relationship Lending in the Czech Republic   21       
 
the data indicates that a half of firms with two relationship lenders tend to default with their 
main bank and keep up their repayments with the second bank.  
The paper also analyses whether the financing model chosen has a significant effect on the 
credit risk of relationship lenders. It turns out that the level of credit risk at bank level 
decreases in line with the extent to which firms applying single relationship lending occur 
in the bank’s portfolio. This result can be explained by a better knowledge of such clients 
by the bank and more effective risk management in this segment and is largely in line with 
the theoretical literature. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Regressions 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm's variables
Turnover in CZK mil 88.46 261.55 0.10 2,000.00
No of employees 51.13 264.02 0.00 12,000.00
Age of the firm in years 8.90 4.99 1.00 19.00
Cyclicality of the industry (correlation with the GDP) 0.77 0.22 -0.31 0.95
Risk of firm (past default rate) 0.09 0.26 0.00 1.00
Year of the oldest loan 2,000.10 4.99 1,990.00 2,008.00
Total debt in CZK mil 124.00 990.00 0.00 134,000.00
Share of FX loans in the fim's debt 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Share of overdrafts in the firm's debt 0.50 0.48 0.00 1.00
No of financing banks 1.18 0.50 1.00 11.00
Share of main relationship lender 0.97 0.11 0.14 1.00
Bank's variables
Bank's 12M default rate 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.41
Share of clients applying dominant relationship banking  0.61 0.25 0.05 1.00
Share of small corporations in total portfolio 0.41 0.31 0.00 1.00
Share of foreign-controlled corporations in portfolio 0.27 0.25 0.00 1.00
Share of forex loans in portfolio 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.99
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth (y-o-y) in the CZ 5.04 1.49 1.80 6.90
GDP growth (y-o-y) in the euro area 1.90 0.87 0.30 3.40
Exchange rate CZK/EUR 29.07 2.45 24.09 32.86
Inflation (y-o-y) in the Czech Republic 2.72 2.02 -0.35 7.35
3M Pribor 2.71 0.76 1.75 4.21
3M Euribor 3.14 1.06 2.03 5.02  CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
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